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ABSTRACT 
 
Keynes proposed that a ‘Commod Control’ agency be created after the Second World 
War to stabilise spot prices of key internationally traded commodities by systematically 
buying and selling physical buffer stocks. In this paper, the creation of a new Global 
Commodity Insurer (GCI) is discussed that would operate an international Commodity 
Price Insurance (CPI) scheme with the objective of protecting national government 
revenues, spending and investment against the adverse impact of short-term deviations 
in commodity prices, and especially oil prices, from their long-run equilibrium level. 
Crude oil is the core commodity in this scheme because energy represents 50% of 
world commodity exports, and oil price shocks have historically had a significant 
macroeconomic impact. In effect the GCI would develop a new international market, 
which is currently missing, designed to protect governments against the risk of declines 
in their fiscal revenue, and increases in the level of claims on that income especially 
from social programmes, brought about by short-term commodity price shocks. GCI 
would take advantage of the rapid growth of trading in derivative securities in the 
global capital market since the 1980s by selling CPI insurance contracts tailored to the 
specific commodity price exposure faced by national government, and offsetting the 
resulting price risk with a portfolio of derivative contracts of five-year or longer 
maturities, supplied by banks, insurers, reinsurers, investment institutions, and 
commodity trading companies, with investment grade credit ratings. The difference 
between the CPI and a buffer stock or export/import control scheme is that it would 
mitigate the macro-economic shocks posed by commodity price volatility, but not 
attempt to control commodity prices. The cost of the CPI scheme is estimated by 
simulating 5-year commodity price paths using a standard log price mean reverting 
model parameterised from an econometric analysis of commodity price time series. 
    7 
1. CONTEXT 
 
At the Bretton Woods conference held after the Second World War, Keynes proposed 
the creation of a Commod Control agency  to operate a global commodity price 
stabilisation scheme. Based on a proposal he had worked on over the previous two 
decades [for key papers see, Keynes (1938), Keynes (1942), Keynes (1943), Keynes 
(1944)] he envisaged the establishment of a series of physical buffer stocks for key 
commodities that would be bought and stored when spot prices were low and then 
released back to the market when prices were high. The primary objective of the 
scheme would be to stabilise the prices of these key commodities in a tightly defined 
range around a long-run sustainable equilibrium level. Combined with an International 
Clearing Union (ICU) and International Development Bank (IDB), he believed that 
Commod Control was an essential third agency necessary to prevent the kind of 
economic dislocation that led to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The ICU became 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the IDB became the World Bank, but the 
Commod Control proposal ran into heavy political opposition on both sides of the 
Atlantic and was never implemented.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the fundamental objectives of Keynes’ 
scheme could be achieved in a modern context through the implementation of an 
International Commodity Price Insurance (CPI) scheme under the direction of a new 
agency that we shall call the Global Commodity Insurer (GCI). This would take 
advantage of the developments in financial markets that were unavailable to Keynes, 
especially in the development of markets for derivative instruments now used 
extensively for the management of market price and credit risk. The objective would 
remain the same, as in Keynes’ original proposal, to protect national economies against 
macroeconomic shocks brought about by short-term deviations in commodity prices 
from their long-run equilibrium level. 
 
1.1. Fifty Years of Commodity Price Stabilisation Schemes 
 
Although Keynes’ idea for Commod Control was never taken up, five drafts of his 
original 1938 proposal were published (the last in 1974), and the issue of commodity 
price stabilisation never disappeared from the international agenda. As a result, a series   8 
of commodity stabilisation schemes were set up after the Second World War (World 
Bank 1999). In 1963, the IMF established the Compensatory and Contingency 
Financing Facility (CCFF) which provided short-term (3¼–5 year) loans to developing 
countries to compensate for reductions in export earnings when commodity prices fell. 
In 1969, the IMF also established the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF) which 
provided  finance to buffer stock schemes meeting certain strict criteria. Under the 
auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) five 
international commodity agreements (ICAs) were also implemented to stabilise prices: 
the International Sugar Agreement (1954–83), the Tin Agreement (1954–85), the 
Coffee Agreement (1962–89), the Cocoa Agreement (1972–88), and the International 
Natural Rubber Agreement (1979–99). The ICA for cocoa, rubber and tin relied wholly 
or partly on buffer stocks, and those for coffee, sugar and tin wholly or partly on export 
controls. In 1975, UNCTAD also passed a resolution calling for an Integrated Program 
for Commodities (IPC) covering ten core commodities and this gave rise to bodies such 
as the International G rains Council, the International Jute Organisation, and the 
International Tropical Timber Organisation. The Common Fund for Commodities 
(CFC), established in 1980, was allocated a $500 million endowment to provide 
liquidity to the IPC to support their mandate to stabilise commodity prices. Under the 
Lomé agreement the European Union (EU) also began offering its own compensatory 
financing schemes to the agricultural sector in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
under the STABEX (1975) and SYSMIN (1985) programs.  
 
All of the ICAs eventually collapsed and as Gilbert (1996) suggests it was perhaps the 
dramatic collapse of the Tin Agreement that finally “persuaded the developed world 
that commodity price stabilisation is infeasible”. In the face of the inflationary impact 
of the second oil price shock, the USA declined to renew its commitment to the 
agreement, just as there was a rapid accumulation of stocks. As a result, financial 
resources were quickly depleted, causing large losses to tin traders, and threatening the 
viability of the London Metal Exchange. The CFC never fulfilled its original purpose 
and at the time of writing its activities are limited to using the interest accruing from its 
original endowment to fund commodity research and development programs. Empirical 
observation of efforts to stabilise commodity prices in the manner prescribed by 
Keynes is that they have largely failed, sometimes catastrophically. Gilbert gloomily 
concludes in his obituary to commodity stabilisation agreements “commodity control   9 
fits uneasily in an increasingly globalised and competitive world and this perception 
has resulted in a diminished willingness to resolve the practical difficulties of price 
stabilisation”. However, empirical observation also suggests that despite the numerous 
failed attempts, national governments of both developed and developing countries 
continue to express a strong interest in stabilising the prices of primary commodities 
that are important to their economies and at considerable cost to their taxpayers.  
 
It is estimated that OECD governments spent US$311 billion, in 2001, supporting 
agriculture, with US$145 billion of that going directly to producers through a variety of 
market price support mechanisms (OECD 2002). As a result, OECD farmers enjoyed 
prices that were on average some 31% above world prices. Although there have been 
reforms, the EU still spent some US$93 billion, or almost 50% of its budget, on its 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2001. The USA spent US$49 billion but in 2002 
the government introduced the US Farm Bill (USDA 2002) and proposed a series of 
counter-cyclical compensation mechanisms that would pay farmers compensation if 
spot prices for a range of commodities fell below predetermined price levels. Until 
recently, many developing countries also regularly intervened in agricultural markets 
and held stockpiles of agricultural products, both for internal consumption and export. 
Paradoxically, in almost all cases where the IMF has been involved in providing 
emergency loans to developing countries, these schemes have been disbanded and the 
remaining stocks sold off as part of an overall package of economic reform and in 
return for financial assistance. 
  
However, developing countries have not been powerless in their attempts to stabilise 
commodity prices. OPEC effectively acts as a stock coordinating mechanism, with oil 
held in store beneath the ground largely controlled by Saudi Arabia. The OPEC statute 
states explicitly that price stability is the main objective: 
 
The OPEC statute requires OPEC to pursue stability and harmony in the petroleum 
market for the benefit of both oil producers and consumers. To this end, OPEC 
Member Countries respond to market fundamentals and forecast developments by 
co-ordinating their petroleum  policies. Production limits are simply one possible 
response. If demand grows, or some oil producers are producing less oil, OPEC can 
increase its oil production in order to prevent a sudden rise in prices. OPEC might 
also reduce its oil production in response to market conditions in order to counter 
falling prices. (OPEC 2000) 
   10 
After the 1973–74 oil price crisis, governments in developed countries also put in place 
mechanisms and systems that allowed them to intervene in energy markets by either 
accumulating or occasionally releasing stockpiled oil. The member states of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) that are net oil importers have a legal obligation 
under the International Energy Program, to hold stocks in public and private hands 
equivalent to 90 days worth of net imports in the previous year. EU member states, 
including the UK and Denmark who are net oil exporters, are required to hold 90 days 
worth of inland consumption of refined products (gasoline, middle distillates and fuel 
oil). In addition, some countries maintain significant stockpiles of coal and nuclear fuel 
within their national borders often reinforced by significant government control over 
and/or informal involvement in the procurement of long-term energy supply contracts 
(e.g. Japan and Korea). 
 
Although nominally held for strategic, security-of-supply reasons, the fact that there has 
never been an outright curtailment of supply by OPEC, even at the height of the two 
major oil price crises in the seventies, suggests that the historic pattern of stockpiling 
energy commodities and their subsequent release onto national markets has really been 
intended to offset the impact of temporary price shocks. Indeed, the US Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which has the capacity to store up to 700 million barrels, 
was used to release crude oil to the domestic market during the Gulf War in 1991, as 
part of the coordinated IEA program in OECD countries which was announced “to 
assure the market of supply” at the launch of the allied attack on 17 January 1991 (even 
though there was no real shortage of oil). The US government openly acknowledges 
that this release was primarily aimed at stabilising prices (Fossil Energy 2002). As at 
the end of 2002, the SPR contained 600 million barrels, or enough to cover 53 days 
worth of imports with a further 100 days worth held by private companies. The cost of 
purchasing and maintaining the SPR inventory held at the end of 2002 amounted to a 
total of US$391 million in 2002 (or US$0.65 per barrel), assuming an original 
construction cost of US$20 billion, a 1.75% annual interest rate, physical losses of 
0.5% per annum, plus miscellaneous operating and maintenance costs of US$25 million 
per annum. If held for five years, a reasonable time-scale over which a sovereign 
government might wish to manage its own oil price exposure, this would increase to 
over US$3.50 per barrel. In addition, it is estimated that the cost of waging the second   11 
Gulf War in Iraq was US$30 billion per month and a continuing presence in the Gulf 
region would cost $10 billion per month. 
 
1.2. Weaknesses of Buffer Stock Schemes 
 
Keynes’ initial proposal was that Commod Control should be responsible for acquiring 
and controlling stocks of key commodities that would be increased if spot prices fell 
more than 10% below their long-run equilibrium level and depleted by selling stocks if 
prices rose more than 10% above that level. The question of what constituted the 
correct equilibrium level was however not well specified. Initially, Keynes suggested 
that this should be determined by the level of production costs but given the difficulty 
of estimating costs of peasant farmers in developing economies; he later suggested that 
it should be determined democratically with each nation’s vote being trade weighted.  
 
Objections were raised to this proposal in the UK Treasury which feared that setting the 
intervention level too high would encourage un-economic levels of production in 
producer countries (though perhaps not surprisingly there was little comment on the 
impact of excess consumption in countries such as the UK if the intervention price was 
set too low). Concerns were also raised that such a scheme would be open to 
speculative attack by arbitrageurs who would be able to trade against the upper and 
lower intervention bounds with little risk. Theoretical work by Prebisch (1950) and 
Singer (1950) suggests that there would be a long-run decline in the terms of trade for 
developing countries because they were relatively more dependent on primary 
commodities for export income than developed countries. Time series analysis of 
commodity prices over the period 1900–1991 by Bleaney & Greenaway (1993) found 
that there had indeed been a long-term downward trend in the ratio of primary 
commodity prices compared to manufactured products. However, this trend was 
negligible over the period 1925–1980 followed by a sudden drop in 1981. Analysis by 
Spraos (1980) revealed that the results are highly sensitive to the starting point of the 
analysis and the quality of the data in available data sets, and concludes that this casts 
significant doubt on previous work that had shown a long-term decline in terms of 
trade.  
   12 
The question of whether commodity price shocks are temporary or persistent 
phenomena are examined by Cashin, Liang & McDermott (2000) who analyse real 
prices for the constituent commodities included in the IMF Index of Fuel and Non Fuel 
Commodities  (IMF Commodity Index). These were calculated from monthly nominal 
price data for the period 1957–1998 and deflated by the index of manufacturing unit 
values (MUV). Their results show that the half-life of a shock (HLS), which is the 
length of time in which a unit shock to a commodity price series declines to half of its 
initial magnitude, is typically long-lasting for metals, crude oil and tree crops except for 
softwoods. Out of 44 commodity price series tested, only 18 commodities exhibited 
persistence of price shocks of less than five years, which they set as an arbitrary cut-off 
point beyond which the cost (finance, storage, output-reduction costs) of sustaining a 
commodity buffer stock scheme would probably become prohibitive. They conclude 
that this is largely why commodity buffer stock schemes collapsed in the 1980s because 
“an adverse price shock to any given commodity is likely to engender depressed prices 
for a long period of time. In such circumstances, government supported price 
stabilization activities and compensatory financing mechanisms are likely to be 
ineffective, and external borrowing for consumption smoothing unsustainable”. 
However, it is interesting to note that, although tin has one of the shortest HLS at three 
months, the International Tin Agreement collapsed spectacularly. Rubber has an HLS 
of 43 months – by their definition close to the margin of sustainability – and yet the 
international Rubber Agreement survived for 19 years. Moreover, crude oil has an 
infinite HLS, suggesting that shocks are permanent, yet the IEA and OPEC continue to 
successfully operate what are effectively buffer stock schemes on both the supply and 
demand sides of the market. 
 
The question of how to deal with the stochastic nature of commodity prices is 
highlighted by Newbery & Stiglitz (1981) who encapsulate the argument in their 
discussion of alternative optimal commodity stockpiling rules. Two issues arise: first, 
that the financing and insurance may be so large that it exceeds the potential benefit of 
stockpiling even if prices are very volatile. More importantly, even if the benefits 
justify the costs, there is always a possibility that a very long run of low prices followed 
by an equally long run of high prices might occur or indeed vice versa. This means that, 
no matter what the starting stock level, there would always be some probability that 
stocks would be depleted before prices fell or that stocks would grow so large that they   13 
exceeded total available storage capacity or finance before prices rose again. For all 
practical purposes, Newbery & Stiglitz conclude that complete price stabilisation in a 
buffer stock scheme is therefore impossible. Although Keynes suggested that stocks for 
individual commodities of between three months and one year of total global 
production should be held, he acknowledged that there might be times when stocks 
could accumulate so rapidly that export controls might also be required to stem the flow 
of surplus production on to the world market.  
 
Keynes appears also to have recognised that there would be practical difficulties in 
determining an appropriate equilibrium price level, and that it certainly could not be 
fixed for all time but allowed to evolve by up to 5% per annum – though he was not 
specific about what events should trigger an adjustment, or what rules would determine 
its level. He also proposed to minimise the cost of Commod Control operations by 
establishing the organisation in London, where the physical stocks would also be held 
and financed by the UK government at lower cost than could be achieved if stocks were 
held in private hands. He appears to have adopted this solution on the basis of estimates 
produced by Graham (1937), a leading US advocate of commodity price stabilisation, 
who suggested that interest and insurance costs could be reduced by a central buying 
organisation, financed through Government borrowing.  
 
From the policy perspective, and regardless of the particular commodity in question, if 
the upper or lower intervention band in a buffer stock scheme is set respectively below 
or above the true long-run equilibrium price level, or if a deterministic trend occurs in 
the equilibrium price level, or if a unit shock occurs that persists and results in a step 
change in the equilibrium price level, then the upper or lower intervention bands will 
eventually be permanently breached and the scheme will inevitably collapse. In effect, 
the buffer stock scheme will be forced into the position of permanent buyer or seller, 
and effectively transformed into a producer or consumer subsidy scheme requiring a 
permanent flow of new finance to sustain it. Stochastic trends may also cause a buffer 
stock scheme to collapse if intervention bands are breached for a sufficiently long 
period of time such that the initial stock of commodity is exhausted by high prices or 
the stock of finance is exhausted by low prices. In short, buffer stock schemes rely on 
price reversion to a sustainable equilibrium price level, correctly identified and agreed 
upon by both consumers and producers. However, as Gilbert (1996) points out, the   14 
demise of the existing buffer stock schemes in the 1980s came about as much because 
consuming and producing nations could not come to a workable agreement on how to 
operate the schemes, or were unwilling to provide the necessary finance, with the result 
that once a significant shock occurred they quickly collapsed. 
 
1.3. The Continuing Case for Commodity Price Stabilisation 
 
In their extensive theoretical analysis Newbery & Stiglitz (1981) conclude, “the 
benefits of price stabilisation are comparatively small compared with the likely cost of 
operating buffer stock(s) and that they are not n ecessarily distributed in favour of the 
producers”. Kanbur (1984) provides a convenient review of the opposing arguments put 
forward by Keynes and Newbery & Stiglitz, and notes that the latter analysis is largely 
a microeconomic one and devotes only 30 out of 450 pages to the macroeconomic 
issues that the Keynesian case rested upon. However, regardless of what the 
conclusions from the theoretical arguments may be, it is clear is that the notion of 
commodity price stabilisation is relevant to the geopolitics of the modern world, as 
evidenced by the continued attention that national governments pay to it and the 
financial resources that the developed world is still spending in attempting to achieve it, 
some 60 years after Keynes’ original proposal. 
After several decades of debates, there is an emerging consensus among economists 
that export instability has a negative effect on growth.   For governments, unforeseen 
variations in export prices can complicate budgetary planning and can jeopardise the 
attainment of debt targets. For exporters, price variability increases cash flow 
variability and reduces the collateral value of inventories: both factors work to increase 
borrowing costs.  Some economists argue that the vulnerability to commodity prices 
affects the rate of growth of productivity.  Others find that vulnerability influences 
growth through instability of the rate of investment and that of the relative prices (or of 
the real exchange rate). These two intermediate instabilities, which have negative 
effects on growth, are clearly related to policy, the implication being that vulnerability 
weakens policy (Aisenman & Marion 1999). Moreover, the instability of the real 
producer prices appears to be a factor of lower growth in agricultural production, which 
itself contributes to a lower global growth and to increased poverty (Guillaumont & 
Combes 1996).    15 
Governments in both the developed and developing world are exposed to volatile 
commodity prices through their fiscal revenues, current spending and long-term 
investment programmes, whether it be arising directly from state control of commodity 
producing or consuming assets (e.g. OPEC oil producers), through government 
subsidies that compensate producers and consumers, or direct purchases of 
commodities for use in the public sector that cannot be directly passed on to consumers 
(e.g. fuel used in schools, hospitals, and social housing). The impact of such volatility 
may also be felt as a secondary effect through the flow of tax revenues from the private 
sector that produces or consumes commodities. In both cases the impact is on either 
government revenues or spending with the net of those two values representing the 
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). Since this is merely the difference 
between a large inflow  (fiscal revenue) and a large outflow (current expenditure and 
investment), even a small change in either of these numbers created by commodity 
price volatility can result in a very large change in the PSBR. The tertiary effect of 
government exposure to commodity price volatility, therefore, is that it directly affects 
its ability to meet payments under existing sovereign debt commitments and impacts 
the cost (i.e. interest rate) on any new borrowing. In extreme cases where a government 
is unable to meet existing debt repayments and has no alternative but to default on its 
sovereign debt, this may result in the country being cut off from global capital markets 
for many years. 
 
Where government deficits cannot be funded by borrowing, perhaps because they are 
cut off from the financial markets by an earlier default, the only solution that remains is 
to curtail current spending, and in particular cancel planned investment. If this involves 
investments in road building, electrification, education, and healthcare programmes the 
impact may be felt beyond the short term, with negative long-term implications for 
economic growth, and on the welfare of the population. In an analysis of the impact of 
the sharp fall in non-oil commodity prices that occurred during the 1980s, Maizels 
(1992) identifies “the development of human resources in terms of improved health, 
education, and skills, is an important end in itself, as well as constituting an essential 
factor in economic growth”. He notes that children are particularly vulnerable to 
economic contractions, and during the 1980s, the nutritional status of children, 
educational provision, infant mortality and morbidity rates did indeed deteriorate in 
many developing countries. The adult population also suffered as the number of people   16 
living below the poverty line increased and government expenditures on food subsidies 
(welfare payments), public health and education fell. Since child malnutrition, disease, 
and illiteracy undermine the mental and physical capacity of the future labour force for 
an entire generation, what this means is that a short-term commodity price shock that 
drives prices far below (or above) the long-run equilibrium level can have a long-
lasting macroeconomic impact for decades into the future and well after commodity 
prices have reverted back to the long-run equilibrium level. While many governments 
recognised the impact on vulnerable groups, the programs they put in place to protect 
them were often undermined by external financial pressures. This was especially the 
case where economies were heavily dependent on primary commodity exports. Maizels 
concludes by proposing what amounts to a call for an international commodity price 
stabilisation scheme linked to a programme of debt restructuring: 
 
A substantial alleviation of these external pressures requires positive international 
policy coordination on a broad front, to include policies to deal with the continuing 
commodity crisis as well as with the debt overhang and the inadequacy of aid and 
other financial flows. (Maizels 1992: ) 
 
It is worth noting that work such as that by Maizels and others such as UNCTAD 
(1991) and Bevan, Collier & Gunning (1993), tends to reinforce the limited perception 
that the macroeconomic impact of commodity price volatility is really just a developing 
country problem, and mainly one involving agricultural products. In fact, as Greenaway 
& Morgan (1999) discuss in the preface of their book, “the importance of primary 
commodities in the world economy is perhaps masked to some extent by a tendency to 
focus on the growth in the production and trade of manufactured goods since the 
1950s”. As they rightly point out, since world trade in primary commodities consists of 
two-way trade flows between developed and developing countries, the issue  of 
commodity prices is a complex interaction between consumers and producers, with all 
the implications that this has for the world economy as a whole.  
 
All countries, regardless of their state of development, are therefore exposed to 
commodity price fluctuations through their import-export trade with the rest of the 
world. Net commodity producing countries (i.e. where primary commodity exports 
exceed imports) will naturally be mostly concerned about falling commodity prices and 
vice versa for net commodity importing countries. While Keynes lost the political battle   17 
to establish Commod Control it is still far from clear that he lost the intellectual battle 
and had he been proposing it now, in the aftermath of a second Gulf War and the 
prospect of a long-term military presence and further conflict in the Gulf continues, he 
might well have received political backing too.  
 
The oil price shocks of 1973–74 and 1978–80 caused major dislocations in developed 
economies with demand falling and unemployment rising, precisely the effects that had 
characterised the depression of the 1930s and which motivated Keynes’s proposal. 
Today, the major petroleum exporting countries (plus Russia) and the developed 
countries face the most important commodity price volatility issues in the twenty-first 
century. This ‘producer/consumer’ couplet has a mutual reciprocal and growing interest 
in promoting energy price stability, including that of natural gas and coal.  
 
The capacity of developed economies to adjust to oil price shocks is becoming ever 
more limited. While developing countries are traditionally thought of as being most 
vulnerable to commodity price shocks because of heavy debt burdens and high 
dependence on one or a few export commodities, the developed world has a greater 
debt burden as a percentage of GDP, as shown in Table 1. Combined with long-term 
unfunded welfare liabilities, which will increase for the foreseeable future due to their 
aging populations, the developed world is also vulnerable to commodity price shocks, 
and this is not therefore an issue that only concerns developing countries. 
Table 1: Allocation of GDP Expenditure and Public Debt Burden in 1999 
 
Source:  UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2002 (GDP) and Bank For International Settlements (Public Debt) 
Note:   GDP Consumption + GDP Investment = Exports – Imports 
Public Debt = Internationally Issued Public Debt Securities + Domestically Issued Public Debt Securities + 
Consolidated Bank Claims on Public Sector    
 
Public Private
Developed Countries 16% 59% 25% 4.0%
Developing Countries 13% 61% 25% 1.3%
    OPEC Members 15% 58% 20% 3.1%
    Other Developing Countries 13% 61% 25% 1.2%
Eastern Europe 16% 58% 21% 2.1%
Public Debt/GDP Economic Groups GDP Consumption GDP Investment  18 
1.4. An Alternative Mechanism 
 
Since Keynes proposed his original scheme, a revolution has taken place in the global 
financial, commodity and capital markets. Beginning in the early 1980s, there was a 
rapid growth in the trading of derivative securities between firms, banks and other 
financial institutions that allowed risk of all kinds to be managed more efficiently and 
cheaply than ever before. Although many commodity producers and consumers in 
developed countries had been managing market price risk for centuries by trading 
simple derivative instruments such as futures, forwards (and to some extent options) 
contracts, as Table 2 shows the volume of derivative contracts traded in markets outside 
commodities during 2001 outstripped that in commodities by a factor of a hundred. 
Moreover, the growth in derivatives trading even in the late 1990s continued to increase 
in most markets by an annually compounded rate of between 25and 100 per cent. 
Table 2: Growth in OTC and Exchange Traded Derivatives 
 
 
Source:   Bank for International Settlements 
Note:   Exchange Traded Commodity contract growth data is contract volume open interest not underlying value 
Exchange Traded Other Contracts includes Single Equity option contracts only 
 
 
Forward (and futures) contract
1 is the simplest of all derivative instruments and obliges 
the buyer and seller to exchange a commodity at some future date, but at a price agreed 
today. In practical terms this means that the only difference between a forward contract 
and a spot contract is the length of time between the date at which the contract is signed 
and the date of delivery – which is generally one or two days for a spot contract and 
could be many months or even years for a forward contract. A fundamental arbitrage 
                                                 
1 Forward contracts and futures contracts are essentially the same instrument, providing the same economic benefit, but the former 
is a contract traded bilaterally between two private counter-parties and the latter is contract traded on a public (regulated) exchange 
which formally contracts with the counter-parties and guarantees contractual performance by collecting and disbursing margin 
payments from them on a daily basis. 
Dec. 1998 Dec. 2001 Change Dec. 1998 Dec. 2001 % Change
$bn $bn % $bn $bn %
Foreign exchange contracts 18011 16748 -7.0% 80.9 93 15.0%
 Forwards, forex swaps, futures 12063 10336 -14.3% 31.7 65.6 106.9%
  Currency swaps 2253 3942 75.0% - - -
  Options 3695 2470 -33.2% 49.2 27.4 -44.3%
Interest rate contracts 50015 77513 55.0% 12654.9 21758.1 71.9%
  Forward rate agreements, futures 5756 7737 34.4% 8031.4 9265.3 15.4%
  Interest rate swaps 36262 58897 62.4% - - -
  Options 7997 10879 36.0% 4623.5 12492.8 170.2%
Equity-linked contracts 1488 1881 26.4% 1200 1946.9 62.2%
  Forwards, swaps, futures 146 320 119.2% 292.1 341.7 17.0%
  Options 1342 1561 16.3% 907.9 1605.2 76.8%
Commodity contracts 415 598 44.1% N/A N/A 26.3%
Other Contracts 10389 14375 38.4% N/A N/A 265.1%
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relationship (see for example Siegel & Siegel 1990) therefore exists between the price 
of a commodity for spot and forward delivery. The forward contract price Ft,T , at 
today’s date t, for delivery at some future date T, is equal to the spot price today Pt plus 
the cost of financing the holding of physical commodity (1+rt,T) between today and the 
future delivery date. To this must be added the cost of storing the spot commodity 
between today and the future delivery date, which is denoted SVt,T  less the convenience 
value foregone when holding a contract for delivery at some future date, denoted CVt,T, 
rather than the physical commodity itself. As a result, the following equation captures 
the relationship at work: 
 
Ft,T = Pt(1+rt,T) + SVt,T - CVt,T 
 
Therefore, when the convenience value is equal to zero the difference between the spot 
and futures price should be just sufficient to cover the cost of financing and storage of 
the physical commodity. When this occurs the market is said to be at full carry and the 
spot price will be in contango (below the forward price). However,  in almost all 
commodities for the great majority of the time the market is not at full carry, as the 
convenience value is almost always greater than zero, and where the convenience value 
exceeds the cost of finance and storage, the market will be in a backwardation with spot 
price above forward price. This has implications for a buffer stock scheme that is 
designed only to provide price stabilisation, and not physical security of supply, 
because it means that the cost of operating such a scheme will always be greater than 
the cost of buying and selling forward contracts.
2  
 
Gilbert (1985) considers whether particular producing or consuming countries benefit 
from the stabilisation of the price of a commodity that is important to them. In 
particular he considers an optimal hedging strategy using futures contracts and 
concludes that for small producers and consumers futures trading is, in terms of risk 
reduction, a perfect substitute for price stabilisation. Although grounded in an elaborate 
proof, this conclusion is not surprising since it is based on the fundamental market 
efficiency assumption that the forward price and expected spot price for any future date 
are equal. Therefore, a producer or consumer that traded a series of forward contracts 
                                                 
2 Technically this assumes there is minimal risk of default by either counter-party to the forward contract, that transaction costs are 
the same in spot and forward contracts, and that the convenience value is greater than zero.  
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today to fix the price of the entirety of its output for all time should expect to receive 
the same revenue, per unit output, as if prices had been permanently fixed by a 
commodity price stabilisation scheme at the true long-run equilibrium price.
3 For large 
producers, who will be interested in revenue stabilisation, and not price stabilisation, 
forward trading will be a perfect substitute for the optimal degree of price stabilisation. 
Gilbert concludes that the crucial advantage that forward contracts offer over an 
international (spot) commodity price stabilisation scheme is that each producer and 
consumer can adopt the optimal forward position for its particular circumstances, while 
a Commod Control agency can only choose a single degree of partial price stabilisation 
from a feasible set which normally excludes complete stabilisation. Moreover, forward 
trading offers producers insurance against both price and production disturbances 
whereas complete price stabilisation makes forward trading impossible: by eliminating 
the need for price insurance, a buffer stock scheme prevents producers from obtaining 
production insurance. 
 
However, these conclusions are based on a comparison of costless futures trading with 
costless buffer stock stabilisation. In the real world, there is financial cost to holding 
buffer stocks while futures contracts are ‘marked to market’ every day and the 
exchange requires initial as well as variation margin to be posted by both the contract 
buyer and seller. This requires access to credit facilities from which margin payments 
can be drawn. Although the trading of forward contracts typically does not require 
margin to be posted if prices rise after a contract has been signed, the buyer of the 
contract would suffer a credit loss equal to the difference between the contract price 
and current market price should the seller default (and vice versa in the case of falling 
prices).  
 
It does appear that futures and forward contracts offer at least a theoretically complete 
solution to the problem of incomplete markets that result in the welfare loss arising 
from commodity price risk, and at a lower cost than a traditional buffer stock scheme. 
However, both futures and forward contracts suffer from one major disadvantage, 
which is that both buyers and sellers are exposed to credit risk. In practice, the act of 
                                                 
3 Keynes proposed the concept of ‘normal backwardation’ in his theory of hedging and speculation in which he suggested that 
forward prices contained a downward bias versus expected future spot prices, representing the premium that producers must pay to 
speculators to allow them to hedge their production for the long term as consumers tend to have short-term hedging horizons and 
behave opportunistically in their  buying. Subsequent work by others suggests that this risk premium only occurs in some 
commodity markets and depends on the specific characteristics of production and consumption.   21 
defaulting on an obligation under the terms of a bank loan, bond, or derivative security 
is merely the exercise of a default option inherent in all such contracts. Lenders 
recognise this default option and increase the interest rate charged on a debt, require the 
deposit of collateral or margin in the case of futures and forward contracts, or in the 
extreme case refuse to make loans to or contract with counter-parties that have a poor 
credit rating.  
 
Gilbert suggests that difficulty in obtaining credit is the most important reason why 
producers in less developed countries make relatively little use of futures (or forward) 
contract trading to hedge their revenues. Even if they could obtain credit, the time 
horizon over which it could be provided is likely to be limited to one crop season as this 
may be the only source of collateral against which futures margin may be borrowed or 
to provide security to a forward contract counter-party. Although Gilbert presents no 
evidence to substantiate this later conclusion, continuous appraisal of counter-party 
credit ratings and quantification of current and potential future credit exposures arising 
from the trading of derivative contracts is an integral part of the risk management 
activities of large financial institutions. Indeed, the assignment of regulatory risk capital 
to cover credit risk arising from derivatives contracts is an absolute requirement under 
the Basle Committee agreement of the Bank for International Settlements and failure to 
do so would immediately mean a financial institution being excluded by other market 
participants from entering into new derivative contracts. Such an event is likely to 
trigger procedures that place it under close administrative supervision control by its 
central bank. Gilbert suggests that the solution to this credit problem is to provide credit 
to producers in developing countries, perhaps from an international agency, and over a 
longer period than is currently available, in order to allow them to hedge. He argues 
that, in the absence of this it will not be possible for futures and forward contract 
hedging to result in the benefits implied by his analysis.  
 
However, options are a class of derivative securities that offer a potential solution to the 
asymmetric nature of the default option inherent in forward contracts while offering 
many of the benefits in terms of optimal revenue stabilisation. Like a futures or forward 
contract, an option provides counter-parties with a contractual mechanism to buy and 
sell a commodity at a specified price today, for delivery at some future date. 
Nevertheless, the rights and obligations arising from an option contract are asymmetric   22 
and this allows the credit risk issues arising from them to be managed more effectively. 
In exchange for an initial premium payment, the seller confers the right on the buyer of 
a call option, but not the obligation, to buy a commodity at a specified price at some 
future date. Likewise, in exchange for an initial premium payment, the seller confers 
the right on the buyer of a put option, but not the obligation, to sell a commodity at a 
specified price at some future date. A call option will only be exercised if the market 
price is above the pre-specified strike price at the moment of expiry and likewise a put 
option will only be exercised if the market price has declined below the strike price. 
Since many readers will already be familiar with the characteristics of options and their 
pricing, a more extensive introduction will not be given here [for a description of the 
relationship between forward (and futures) and options contracts and options pricing 
see for example, Brealey & Myers (2002) and more advanced texts such as Cox & 
Rubinstein (1985) and Hull (1989)]. 
 
A primary commodity producer or consumer, with a poor credit rating, and a financial 
institution, with an investment grade credit rating, are natural counter-parties to an 
options contract. This is because it allows the producer or consumer to be insured 
against volatile prices, without posing a credit risk to the financial institution at any 
time during the life of the contract and regardless of market conditions, but also since it 
has no other obligation under the contract than to pay the initial option premium. The 
commodity producer or consumer faces a potential credit exposure to the financial 
institution if prices rise above the strike price of a call option or below the strike price 
of a put option but the credit risk is limited by the investment grade credit rating of the 
financial institution that makes default a low probability event. However, in addition to 
allowing the producer to access markets from which it may otherwise be excluded, an 
option contract would also provide them with an opportunity to continue to benefit 
from favourable price movements. For example, a producer that has purchased put 
options for protection against downward price moves will never exercise its option if 
prices remain above the strike price, but will simply sell at the higher prevailing market 
price instead. The same argument applies in reverse for a consumer that hedged against 
rising prices by buying a call option. 
 
The equivalence of the futures price and expected future spot prices for any date in the 
future also has implications for hedging with options contracts. Suppose a commodity   23 
producer were to simultaneously purchase a put option and sell a call option with 
identical strike prices and expiration dates. Ignoring the incremental transaction cost of 
two, rather than one, transactions, the market risk and credit risk exposure of the 
producer would be identical to that arising if it had simply sold a futures contract. 
Assuming that the options market is unbiased, a consumer that buys a long series of 
options to hedge the entirety of its production for all time should therefore theoretically 
receive the same revenue less transaction costs as if it had sold its production under a 
perfect commodity stabilisation scheme at the long-run equilibrium price. Similarly, 
consumers who continuously buy call options will expect to pay the long-run 
equilibrium price plus transaction costs. 
 
The asymmetric nature of options contracts means that they have characteristics that are 
virtually identical to insurance contracts, in the sense that the buyer of such a contract 
only pays an initial premium and the rights under the contract need only be exercised 
when some adverse event takes place. Not surprisingly, insurance companies have 
begun to operate in derivatives markets, for example in trading sovereign and credit 
risk, and derivatives market operators have begun to trade risks typically associated 
with insurance such as weather or catastrophe risk. The existing trade in commodity 
options therefore represents a starting point for the creation of a  market in which 
governments might insure themselves against commodity price risks. However, in order 
for CPI contracts to serve the same purpose as a commodity buffer stock scheme, the 
contracts would have to have expiration dates that are far longer than those typical of 
commodity derivative contracts currently being traded – which typically have expiry 
dates of a few months, and at most a few years, from the date of contracting. Since the 
writing of insurance contracts on an individual life, for 25 years or more, or the issuing 
of corporate and sovereign government bonds for similar maturities, is a common 
occurrence in modern financial markets there is no technical or legal reason why 
insurance contracts of 3–10 year maturities could not be created for commodity price 
risk. 
 
In the next section of this paper, the creation of a GCI is discussed which would issue, 
and then manage the risk arising from CPI contracts designed to stabilise the fiscal 
revenues, current expenditure, and investment, against fluctuations in commodity 
prices. Alternative institutional forms of the GCI are also discussed: how it would   24 
integrate into the global financial system, and its interaction with existing national 
subsidy and price mechanisms (e.g. EU CAP, US Farm Bill 2002, OPEC and other 
existing price support and subsidy schemes) are also considered. The costs of 
implementing CPI contracts for the major internationally traded commodities are also 
estimated, based upon an econometric analysis of the long-run equilibrium price for 
each; the rate at which prices revert to that equilibrium price after a shock; and the 
residual stochastic price volatility. Finally, the benefits, costs and risk capital 
requirements of a CPI scheme are estimated.   25 
2. SCHEME 
 
From the point of view of national governments in developing countries, investment in 
education, immunisation, welfare, road building, electrification and the like may take a 
decade to complete and a generation before a payoff occurs in terms of an increase in 
economic growth and welfare of the population. In developed countries the long-term 
healthcare, social programmes and pension obligations of an aging population stretch 
into the far distant future. Under these circumstances, short-term (day-to-day or month-
to-month) commodity price volatility will be of relatively little consequence to a 
government, so that any mechanism put in place must also be capable of mitigating the 
impact of commodity price shocks on a year-to-year basis, over the long term. Overall, 
given the nature of the electoral cycle, government planning horizons, or just the length 
of time that a road takes to build or a child to be educated to primary level, a time 
horizon of 3–10 years seems appropriate. In the remainder of this section, details are 
given of the CPI scheme which would insure governments against the impact of oil 
price shocks on their revenues and costs. The overriding objective would be to provide 
compensating payments to governments of countries that are net producers of 
commodity(s) if the average annual spot price(s) fall below a pre-specified price floor 
and reciprocally compensate governments of countries that are net consumers of 
commodity(s) if average annual spot price(s) rise above a pre-specified strike price. 
 
2.1. Commodity Price Insurance Contract Features 
 
Many of the sovereign governments of countries that would be candidates for using the 
CPI scheme have little revenue to finance the purchase of hedging instruments. As their 
credit rating may already be impaired, and the necessary skills may not be available to 
manage complex hedging programmes locally, the design of the risk management 
instruments will be constrained by cost and complexity considerations. In addition, 
forward contracting would commit a government to deliver specific quantities of 
commodity output to the market and therefore leave it exposed to any shortfall in 
production brought about by natural disasters, civil disturbance, or war. If that country 
also happened to account for a large share of global production in that commodity (e.g. 
Brazil in coffee, Côte d’Ivoire in cocoa, Saudi Arabia in oil) then such a shortfall is also 
likely to be accompanied by a rise in world prices. The combined effect of the   26 
government of a major commodity producing country entering into a  hedging 
programme, based on forward contracting, with a supply dislocation, would be to leave 
the country with an obligation to cover the shortage it had created where any purchases 
it attempted to make to cover the shortfall would immediately drive prices sharply 
higher. The net result would be an increase in the sovereign debt of that country at the 
time it was least able to service it. Ultimately, the government would be forced to 
default on its obligations under the hedging programme. For practical operational as 
well as financial reasons an insurance contract is therefore a more appropriate 
instrument for managing sovereign government exposure to commodity price risks 
than, for example, a traditional forward contract based hedging programme. The nature 
of an insurance contract is that once purchased it requires no further management other 
than to make a claim should a loss occur. The initial payment of premium imposes no 
credit risk on the provider of the CPI regardless of the credit quality of the government 
purchasing the insurance. Finally, the symmetric nature of insurance also means that 
governments buying CPI contracts would face no other obligation than the payment of 
an initial premium, so would face no risk of a physical shortfall due to unforeseen 
disruptions to production.  
 
The basic form of a CPI contract for a generic commodity would be as follows: 
 
1.  A CPI contract would provide insurance protection against market price risk in 
each of the 49 separate commodities, and each of the 8 sub-indices, included in 
the IMF Commodity Index (see Table 3 for full list); 
2.  The nominal underlying value of a CPI contract would be tailored to the 
exposure faced by each sovereign government to commodity price risk; 
3.  Where a country was a net importer of a commodity, a ‘CPI-Max’ contract 
would provide insurance against the price of a given commodity rising above a 
pre-specified upper bound level (‘upper strike price’); and where the country 
was a net exporter of a commodity, a ‘CPI-Min’ contract would provide 
insurance against the price of a given commodity falling below a pre-specified 
lower bound (‘lower strike price’); 
4.  New CPI contracts would be purchased annually, with premiums paid once and 
for all up front at the purchase date of the contract, and with a minimum 
maturity of three years;   27 
5.  Contract settlement would occur immediately after the CPI contract expiration 
date; 
6.  The settlement amount on each CPI contract would be equal to the difference 
between the pre-specified strike price and the reference market price calculated 
from the mean monthly prices published in the IMF Commodity Index for the 
year immediately preceding the CPI contract expiration date; 
7.  It is anticipated that sovereign government would continuously adjust the 
degree of price protection (both in terms of underlying insured value and strike 
price) to be covered by a CPI contract, depending on their net exposure, as well 
as the cost they were willing to bear. In practice, they would eventually 
construct a portfolio of CPI holdings with a variety of maturities, strike prices 
and underlying nominal contract values;  
8.  GCI would be the counter-party to all CPI contract sales and purchases, 
responsible for collecting premiums, and settlement; 
9.  GCI would call regular tenders to procure appropriate offsetting contracts from 
the global capital and insurance markets to manage the price risk exposure 
underlying the CPI contracts it sold. The GCI as aggregator of risk, would 
benefit from the inherent diversification effects in the portfolio of commodity 
price risks and thereby reduce the overall cost of operating the global scheme; 
and 
10. The risk of sovereign governments deliberately over-hedging to speculate on 
future commodity prices would be prevented by limiting the total contract 
position they held in any given year to some fixed percentage of the national net 
import-export balance in each commodity. 
 
In order for CPI contracts to serve as an effective insurance against long-term 
commodity price exposures, the contracts would have expiration dates far longer (at 
least three years maturity) than those typical of commodity derivatives contracts 
currently being traded, and in much higher volumes.  
 
2.2. Global Commodity Insurer 
 
It is clear that given the international nature of the CPI contract regime and the fact that 
it would operate at the governmental level in conjunction with existing institutions (e.g.   28 
World Bank, IMF, OECD, OPEC), such a scheme would have to operate via a central 
agency. In principle, the GCI could take on many legal forms and functions, but in 
practice this would be limited by the fact that it would need to act as counter-party in all 
transactions, at least initially. This means that it could not act merely as an insurance 
broker of CPI contracts between governments and the international capital market. 
However, whether it should be structured as an insurance company or insurance 
exchange and who would provide the organisation with the necessary risk capital is an 
open question. 
 
If the GCI were set up as an insurance company, its function would be to define the 
form and structure of CPI contracts appropriate for each sovereign government and 
then sell them. The risk assumed in the portfolio of contracts sold could be managed 
either by purchasing offsetting option contracts or reinsurance contracts from the 
international capital and insurance market, or by funding any losses from its own 
capital. This structure assumes that the GCI would be both competitor to, and counter-
party to, the world’s major insurers, financial institutions and commodity trading 
houses who may be willing to offer similar CPI type contracts to governments without 
using the GCI as an intermediary. The GCI role would be to act as a catalyst or ‘market 
maker’ completing the market by designing and offering CPI contracts. Once the 
market developed, competing providers of CPI contracts might emerge. 
 
An alternative GCI structure would be to operate as an organised exchange that traded 
standardised CPI contract components that could be combined and recombined to 
construct appropriate portfolios, depending on the sovereign government concerned. In 
this case, the GCI would largely be competing against existing commodity exchanges 
by offering alternative hedging products that could be bought and sold continuously 
through brokers. Since the counter-parties would be dealing with each other via the 
exchange, the GCI role would be to monitor and report traded prices, settle trades that 
occurred, and manage its credit exposure to the sellers of CPI contracts.  
 
In the case of GCI as CPI market maker it would potentially be taking on significant 
market risk on any unhedged portion of its CPI sales and credit risk on any hedging 
contracts it purchased. As an exchange, it would take on no market risk because any 
CPI contract sold would have an exactly equal and offsetting CPI contract purchase   29 
against it and GCI would then only face a potential credit exposure to counter-parties 
who had sold CPI contracts.  
 
Clearly, the requirement for risk capital if GCI were an exchange would be 
significantly less than that of a CPI market maker that remained partially or wholly 
unhedged – but the question of who should supply that capital is still present in both 
cases. In Keynes’ original Commod Control proposal he had assumed that the capital 
would be provided by either the UK Treasury in the form of gold which would be 
transferred to it, or sold off in the global market in exchange for buffer stocks of 
physical commodity, or be provided by the major consuming countries in the form of 
guarantees or credits  which would be temporarily drawn down and replenished as 
required. The provision of such a government backed guarantee structure is similar to 
that which has supported the IMF and World Bank since their inception. However, 
given that developing countries would be unlikely to have the necessary financial 
resources to provide such a guarantee, then in effect the developed world would be 
asked to provide risk capital to an organisation that only partially operated to service 
their needs. An alternative capital structure might be to adopt that used by organised 
commodity exchanges which typically sell seats or rights to firms who wish to transact 
or operate on the exchange. In this case, the providers of CPI contracts are obvious 
candidates to provide capital to the GCI. Since they will clearly be the only source of 
credit exposure it seems reasonable that they should provide the necessary capital to 
offset it.  
 
2.3. Integration with the Global Financial System 
 
The question of whether the global financial market would have the capacity to provide 
the necessary volume of CPI contract cover is crucial since GCI would not be able to 
rely solely on governments to provide the necessary finance. Since we have assumed 
that commodity producers and consumers in developed countries are already operating 
in commodity derivatives markets to the extent that they need to for their own risk 
management purposes, the provision of further commodity risk capital from this source 
is unlikely. The only remaining source is the global capital market comprising 
commercial and investment banks, investment institutions, and insurance companies. 
Though the appetite of the global capital market for commodity risk is unknown, Table   30 
2 shows that between 1998 and 2001 the total volume of derivatives contracts 
outstanding was still growing rapidly, albeit commodity instruments were the smallest 
component of that. On this basis, it appears that the capacity of the global financial 
markets to provide new capital for the trading of derivative risk is not constrained, nor 
is its willingness to trade new derivative instruments.  
 
Another potential source of risk capital might be derived from a change in the asset 
allocation patterns of long-term investors, such as pension funds, who have almost 
completely avoided primary commodity price exposure except incidentally via the 
exposures of the bonds and equities of firms in which they have already invested. The 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and efficient market hypothesis suggest that such 
investors  would benefit if they were to accept some commodity price risk in their 
portfolios because of the diversification benefits it would bring. Given the size of 
pension fund assets worldwide, even a small shift of asset allocation strategies might be 
sufficient to attract all the necessary capital that GCI required. In practice, it seems 
likely that a tiered approach to acquiring risk capital might be required. Offsetting 
derivative contracts purchased from capital market participants such as commodity 
trading houses, producers and consumers as well as investment banks, and investing 
institutions would be the first and largest source of risk capital. The next level might be 
made up of conventional loans, bonds, and equity issued to public and private investors. 
Finally, guarantees provided by governments and/or possibly channelled through the 
IMF, World Bank, and UNCTAD could provide the final element of the capital base.  
 
Though the response of the global financial system to CPI, and its willingness to bear 
incremental commodity price risk is uncertain, rough estimates of the potential 
incremental capacity required can be drawn from the total volume of CPI contracts that 
would be required if each country were to cover the entire volume of net exports and 
imports of primary commodities. Since total world primary commodity exports must be 
equal to the net of total world primary commodity production less domestic 
consumption of producing countries, and total world net exports must equal total world 
net imports, then the underlying commodity price exposure is relatively easy to 
calculate as twice the total world primary commodity exports of approximately US$1.3 
trillion per annum, meaning that total net exposure per year to be covered by CPI 
contracts would equal US$2.6 trillion. Assuming the entire primary commodity export-  31 
import trade was to be insured for a period of five years that would mean a total 
nominal underlying contract volume of US$12 trillion requiring an annual growth rate 
of 100% per annum in outstanding commodity derivative contracts. Assuming no 
growth in any other form of derivative contracts, and that each CPI was offset by one 
additional derivative contract trade, then the total volume of outstanding commodity 
contracts would grow to approximately 10% of the global total of derivative contracts 
now outstanding (as summarised in Table 2). Currently commodity derivatives account 
for approximately 3% of outstanding contracts so the increase would not be significant 
compared with the current annual growth rate in total derivative contracts outstanding. 
It therefore appears that such an increase could be absorbed relatively easily without 
large incremental amounts of risk capital being made available in the derivatives 
market.  
 
2.4. Interaction with Existing Schemes 
 
The CPI scheme discussed here is limited to sovereign governments as potential buyers 
because it is assumed that private individuals and firms could participate in commodity 
derivative markets, if they wish to. The CPI scheme would therefore be incremental to 
this existing trade and designed to complete the market by allowing governments to 
purchase protection against the type of commodity price volatility over time horizons 
and in volumes that are not currently available to them. However, private firms and 
individuals would be the ultimate guarantors of CPI contracts through the provision of 
risk capital to the global derivative, insurance and capital markets from which GCI 
would purchase offsetting hedging contracts. To this extent, it is entirely possible that 
private firms might ultimately wish to operate on both sides of the market for CPI 
contracts, and that secondary trading in these instruments, where GCI would not 
necessarily be a counter-party, could occur. 
 
The GCI would not aim to interfere with the activities of institutions or exchanges 
operating in global capital and commodity markets. Neither would it be in conflict with 
the roles of established international organisations such IMF, World Bank, UNCTAD, 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and International Energy 
Agency (IEA). Instead, it would work closely with them and supplement their existing 
functions. Since the CPI contracts would not stabilise prices, but merely offset the   32 
consequences of spot price volatility, any actions taken by these existing agencies 
would be supplementary and complementary to that of the GCI. The fact that GCI 
would not intervene in commodity spot markets, or indeed trade in them, means that it 
would be less likely to distort price s ignals received by private consumers and 
producers, than any subsidy or price support schemes would. Crucially, the strike prices 
and cost of the CPI scheme would be determined by markets, not bilateral or 
multilateral negotiation between governments (as K eynes envisaged), therefore it 
would be inherently more flexible and robust than a buffer stock scheme. Governments 
would individually and continuously adjust their long-run equilibrium price 
expectations and select the appropriate level of protection accordingly.  
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3. ANALYSIS 
 
The IMF Commodity Index covering the period 1980–2001 is based on 8 sub-indices 
covering non-fuel commodities, edibles, foods, beverages, industrial inputs, agricultural 
raw materials, metals and energy. In turn, these sub-indices are calculated from 49 
underlying price series for individual spot commodities. Such prices are calculated on a 
monthly basis from mean daily closing spot prices. The weighting of the individual 
commodities in the IMF Commodity Index are shown in Figure 1 and are based on the 
average world export earnings for each commodity reflecting trade flows in the period 
1995–1997 (rebased in March 2003 so that the index value for 1995 = 100, in terms of 
US$). Although these new weights exclude intra-EU trade, the index still represents a 
convenient starting point for measuring the impact of changes in commodity prices on 
the global economy. Time series data for the old and new index and underlying 
components have been collected on a monthly basis since 1980 and are available to 
download from the IMF website (IMF 2002).  
Figure 1: IMF Commodity Index (New 1995–97 Weights) 
3.1. Time Series Modelling  
 
The existence of price mean reversion in commodity time series is well established [see 
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unlimited dispersion that occurs in price time series evolving as a geometric 
(Brownian) random walk it reduces the risk capital required, and hence cost, of 
managing commodity price volatility through a CPI scheme. The impact of price mean 
reversion and volatility has been modelled for the IMF Commodity Index, sub-indices, 
and underlying commodity time series by assuming that the evolution of prices 
conforms to an arithmetic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck price mean reversion process and 
successfully applied in oil price time series by Schwartz (1997). For each index or price 
series, the mean value for each year over the period 1990–2002 was calculated to 
eliminate any seasonal effects and then the following regression run for each: 
 
xt – x t-1 = a + b xt-1 + e t. 
 
where xt is equal to the natural log of the annual price or index level, and xt – x t-1 
represents the continuously compounded annual return from holding a spot commodity 
before storage and financing costs. A long-run equilibrium price (m) and price mean 
reversion (h) parameter were then derived directly from the regression output: 
 
m = e 
-a/b 
 
h = - ln(1 + b) 
 
The standard deviation (s) of the residual returns from the regression output provides 
an approximate estimate of the short-run (annual) volatility of prices around the long-
run equilibrium level. The results are summarised in Table 3 and show that the long-run 
equilibrium price for each commodity is within 5% of the mean price over the last ten 
to twenty years of the twentieth century. The price mean reversion process exhibits a 
parameter of the order of 2–5% per month, meaning that prices are expected to revert to 
their long-run equilibrium level within a year or less after a single 25% shock has 
occurred. The results also provide an index of the relative risk imposed by oil price 
volatility versus other commodities. It is striking that energy not only constitutes almost 
50% of the IMF export weighted index, but also the volatility of oil (and gas) prices 
(s
2
Annual), after adjusting for price mean reversion, are among the highest of all 
commodities. This further explains why the OPEC-IEA axis receives such strong 
multilateral support. 
 
[ 2 ] 
[ 3 ] 
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In the case of oil, Figure 2 also shows that, despite the extreme price volatility caused 
by the approaching war with Iraq, the long-run forward price for crude oil (WTI) traded 
on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) remained close to the long-run 
equilibrium level calculated above. On 24 February 2003, before war broke out, WTI 
for delivery in December 2009 was trading at US$23.77, while the spot price was 
US$36.79. On 6 May 2003, shortly after the war had finished, WTI for forward 
delivery in December 2009 was barely changed at US$23.95, even though the spot 
price had fallen to US$25.65. The NYMEX is unique among commodity exchanges in 
having such long-term forward contract quotes, and even though liquidity is very low at 
this horizon, the forward price quoted here during and after a time of extreme market 
stress is close to the estimated long-run equilibrium price of US$20.32 (allowing for a 
US$2.00 barrel premium of WTI over the IMF Oil Index). 
Figure 2: Nymex Forward Curve and Long-Run Equilibrium Oil Price 
 
Source: NYMEX closing prices on relevant dates from www.nymex.com 
 
These results suggest that short-term deviations from long-run equilibrium do indeed 
occur in spot oil prices but that they revert over time and are not therefore a random 
walk process as typically observed for financial assets (e.g. equities). The fact that a 
long-run equilibrium price can be calculated for oil and other commodities, all be it 
with significant periodic deviations, confirms that an international scheme to manage 
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volatility is not only theoretically feasible, but that the cost of implementing such a 
scheme is bounded by economic fundamentals. 
Table 3: IMF Commodity Index Mean Reversion, and Volatility Parameters 
 
Source: IMF Commodity Index and authors’ own calculations 
 
3.2. Simulating CPI Prices 
 
Given that stable long-run equilibrium prices do appear to exist for oil (and other 
commodities) it is reasonable to conclude that such a price level could be used as the 
basis for designing a scheme to protect national government revenue and expenditure 
a b Mean Price LR Price Volatility %
Index of Fuel and Non Fuel Commodities (1995=100) 100.0 3.58 -0.78 98.42 99.36 11.5%
Index of Non-Fuel Primary Commodities (1995=100) 52.2 0.94 -0.21 85.73 83.08 7.7%
Edibles Index (1995=100) 24.7 0.64 -0.15 88.79 82.83 7.5%
Food Index 27.4 0.80 -0.18 89.86 84.21 7.4%
Index of Beverages, Coffee, Cocoa, and Tea 21.7 2.23 -0.51 81.27 81.77 21.5%
Index of Industrial Inputs (1995=100) 3.1 1.92 -0.44 82.97 82.49 9.4%
Index of Agricultural Raw Materials (1995=100) 11.3 0.95 -0.22 86.21 81.51 7.6%
Metals index 16.1 2.82 -0.64 80.70 81.33 10.7%
Energy Index: Crude oil, Natural Gas and Coal 47.8 2.59 -0.55 112.27 115.10 20.1%
Average Petroleum Spot index of UK Brent, Dubai, amd West Texas 39.9 2.60 -0.55 114.98 118.09 21.7%
Aluminum, LME standard grade, minimum purity, cif UK 6.0 7.12 -0.97 1461.20 1491.86 9.3%
Bananas, Avg of Chiquita, Del Monte, Dole, US Gulf delivery 0.6 5.08 -0.82 470.90 472.01 13.1%
Barley, Canadian Western No. 1 Spot 0.4 2.43 -0.53 90.64 95.37 15.4%
Beef, Australia/New Zealand frozen, U.S. import price 1.4 2.22 -0.50 91.81 86.36 6.9%
Coal thermal for export, Australia 2.7 1.41 -0.41 31.69 30.66 13.2%
Coal thermal for export, South Africa 0.7 2.67 -0.79 29.32 29.31 13.2%
Cocoa, ICO price, cif U.S. & European ports 0.7 4.81 -0.66 1357.69 1391.62 21.2%
Coffee, Other Milds, El Salvdor and Guatemala, ex-dock New York 1.4 2.05 -0.44 111.51 106.64 33.5%
Coffee, Robusta, Uganda and Cote dIvoire, ex-dock New York 0.6 0.74 -0.19 71.56 49.91 38.9%
Cocoanut Oil, Philippine/Indonesia, cif Rotterdam 0.2 2.57 -0.41 572.19 558.32 24.2%
Cooper 0.6 2.41 -0.32 1988.32 1851.26 17.8%
Cotton, Liverpool Index A, cif Liverpool 1.1 0.92 -0.22 66.75 60.02 19.1%
Fishmeal, 64/65 percent, any orig, cif Rotterdam 2.6 3.78 -0.60 497.62 521.12 19.0%
Groundnut, US runners, cif European 0.0 2.17 -0.32 916.18 819.18 7.1%
Hides;  US, Chicago, fob Shipping Point 3.0 2.54 -0.58 82.62 82.89 6.3%
Iron Ore Carajas 1.8 3.02 -0.90 29.07 29.04 4.9%
Lamb; New Zealand, PL frozen, London price 0.3 4.11 -0.85 127.95 128.00 11.6%
Lead; LME, 99.97 percent pure, cif European 0.3 3.01 -0.48 539.43 553.02 14.7%
Log; soft, export from U.S. Pacific coast 0.6 0.95 -0.19 180.50 142.53 8.6%
Log; hard, Sarawak, import price Japan 2.0 1.55 -0.30 231.52 166.42 12.8%
Maize; U.S. number 2 yellow, fob Gulf of Mexico 1.7 1.93 -0.41 108.42 106.66 16.2%
Russian Natural Gas, in Germany 2.1 3.84 -0.84 97.45 95.73 22.3%
Natural Gas, Indonesian LNG, CIF Japan 1.7 2.51 -0.57 81.41 82.23 18.5%
Natural Gas, US domestic; CIF Henry Hub, LA 0.7 1.94 -0.42 96.48 100.79 26.5%
Nickel; LME, melting grade, cif N Europe 1.2 8.88 -1.01 6631.25 6672.93 18.9%
Oil; Average of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate 39.9 1.64 -0.55 19.78 20.32 21.7%
Olive Oil, less that 1.5% FFA 0.2 3.83 -0.47 3597.63 3613.95 21.6%
Orange Brazilian, CIF France 0.5 5.67 -0.92 474.56 475.03 16.2%
Palm Oil; Malaysia and Indonesian, cif NW Europe 0.8 2.62 -0.43 470.50 464.64 24.6%
Hogs, 51-52% lean, 170-191 lbs; IL, IN, OH, MI, KY 1.0 2.78 -0.69 60.68 57.76 22.7%
Chicken, Ready-to-cook, whole, iced, FOB Georgia Docks 1.0 1.87 -0.45 59.81 61.47 4.3%
Rice; 5 percent broken, nominal price quote, fob Bangkok 1.1 0.65 -0.12 259.08 215.00 14.6%
Rubber; Malaysian, fob Malaysia and Singapore 1.1 0.98 -0.27 42.53 39.69 24.4%
Norwegian Fresh Salmon; farm bred; export price 2.6 0.07 -0.09 3.94 2.07 8.4%
Sawnwood; dark red meranti, select quality 1.4 2.14 -0.34 641.34 568.44 14.6%
Sawnwood; average of softwoods, U.S. West coast 2.4 4.08 -0.72 289.36 289.74 4.8%
Shrimp; U.S., frozen 26/30 count, wholesale NY 1.2 1.82 -1.00 6.16 6.23 11.7%
Soybean Meal; 44 percent, cif Rotterdam 1.1 3.30 -0.63 200.91 194.31 18.5%
Soybean Oil; Dutch, fob ex-mill 0.5 2.31 -0.37 503.84 488.99 19.0%
Soybean; U.S., cif Rotterdam 1.5 1.46 -0.27 243.37 227.02 11.5%
Sugar; EC import price, cif European 0.4 0.49 -0.15 27.49 25.32 5.8%
Sugar; International Sugar Agreement price 1.4 0.38 -0.19 9.65 7.41 20.7%
Sugar; US, import price contract number 14 cif 0.1 1.76 -0.57 21.59 21.51 4.5%
Sunflower Oil; any origin, ex-tank Rotterdam 0.3 4.40 -0.69 573.00 571.37 18.3%
Tea; From July 1998,Kenya auctions, Best Pekoe Fannings. Prior, London auctions, c.i.f. U.K. warehouses 0.4 2.24 -0.42 204.35 203.01 13.0%
Tin; LME, standard grade, cif European 0.3 -0.69 0.08 5353.87 7746.65 9.2%
Uranium, NUEXCO, Restricted Price, US$ per pound 0.7 1.08 -0.46 10.60 10.44 16.4%
Wheat; U.S. number 1 HRW, fob Gulf of Mexico 2.8 1.70 -0.34 146.21 146.04 15.5%
Wool Coarse; 23 micron, AWEX 0.4 3.13 -0.52 388.03 408.00 22.8%
Wool Fine; 19 micron, AWEX 0.6 7.88 -1.21 656.92 670.15 11.0%
Zinc; LME, high grade, cif UK 0.9 4.52 -0.65 1022.44 1006.40 14.2%
Parameter Estimates Index 
Weight %
Index Constituents
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against oil and other commodity price shocks. For example, countries wishing to 
protect themselves against an oil price rise will effectively be purchasing a portfolio of 
CPI-Max contracts, and those wishing to protect themselves against an oil price fall 
will be purchasing a portfolio of CPI-Min contracts. As the payoff on these CPI 
contracts depends on the mean price of a basket of WTI, Brent and Dubai crude oil over 
the year before expiration, rather than a price only on a single date, their cost will be 
significantly lower than that of long-term American style option contracts (assuming 
that these could even be purchased) typically traded on exchanges such as NYMEX. 
 
Table 4 summarises the theoretical cost of both CPI-Max and CPI-Min contracts of 
five-year maturity expressed as a percentage of the long-run equilibrium price of each 
of the commodities and sub-indices in the IMF Commodity Index. These have been 
calculated by simulating 1000 price paths for each time series to a five-year horizon, 
and then calculating the mean discounted payoff for CPI-Max and CPI-Min contracts 
assuming that the initial commodity spot price at time zero is equal to the long-run 
equilibrium price (m), and that the CPI-Max and CPI-Min strike prices are respectively 
set at 10% above and below the long-run equilibrium level. 
 
The payoffs at the five-year horizon are discounted to present value at the risk free rate 
assuming an upward sloping term structure for interest rates beginning at 2% for year 1, 
and increasing at 0.25% per annum thereafter which approximately corresponds to the 
zero coupon yield curve on a US Government bond as at 31 December 2002. The 
current spot price and forward prices are assumed to be equal, and therefore the forward 
price curve is horizontal. More technically, this assumes that the financing, insurance 
and storage cost of holding each commodity is exactly equal to the convenience yield.  
 
The price paths were simulated from the recursive form of the regression equation [2] 
above by substituting the a and b regression parameters summarised in Table 3: 
 
xt = – x t-1 + a + b xt-1 + s dz 
 
In order to calculate xt for the first year, the x t-1 value is set equal to a, then for 
subsequent years, the index or price level calculated from the previous year (xt) feeds 
[ 5 ]   38 
into the calculation for the next year as (xt1).
4 However, the approximate volatility 
parameter ( s) previously estimated cannot be used because distributions of spot 
commodity log price returns are rarely normal, even after adjusting for seasonality and 
mean reversion, and prone to significant heteroscedacity (so called ‘fat tails’). Any s 
estimate will therefore inevitably contain some, perhaps significant, estimation error.  
Table 4: Simulated Theoretical Cost of CPI-Max and CPI-Min Contracts 
 
                                                 
 
4 The data were held on an Excel spreadsheet and sampled randomly with equal weights using a VBA routine to collect data from 
each run. Though the underlying random number generator set has a repeat cycle of 1,000,000 only 70,000 values are used in each 
simulation run here so this is unlikely to have produced a systematic repeating pattern that would have introduced a significant bias. 
CPI-Max CPI-Min CPI-Max CPI-Min CPI Call CPI Put
Index of Fuel and Non Fuel Commodities (1995=100) 100 99.36 109.30 89.42 1.12 0.79 1.13% 0.72%
Index of Non-Fuel Primary Commodities (1995=100) 52.2 83.08 91.39 74.77 0.91 0.63 1.10% 0.69%
Edibles Index (1995=100) 24.7 82.83 91.11 74.55 1.10 0.77 1.33% 0.85%
Food Index 27.4 84.21 92.63 75.79 0.92 0.71 1.09% 0.76%
Index of Beverages, Coffee, Cocoa, and Tea 21.7 81.77 89.94 73.59 4.83 2.72 5.90% 3.03%
Index of Industrial Inputs (1995=100) 3.1 82.49 90.73 74.24 0.86 0.53 1.04% 0.59%
Index of Agricultural Raw Materials (1995=100) 11.3 81.51 89.66 73.36 0.82 0.63 1.00% 0.70%
Metals index 16.1 81.33 89.46 73.20 0.92 0.47 1.13% 0.53%
Energy Index: Crude oil, Natural Gas and Coal 47.8 115.10 126.62 103.59 4.92 3.04 4.28% 2.40%
Average Petroleum Spot index of UK Brent, Dubai, amd West Texas 39.9 118.09 129.90 106.28 5.81 3.53 4.92% 2.71%
Aluminum, LME standard grade, minimum purity, cif UK 6 1,491.86 1641.04 1342.67 9.59 4.54 0.64% 0.28%
Bananas, Avg of Chiquita, Del Monte, Dole, US Gulf delivery 0.6 472.01 519.21 424.81 7.91 6.11 1.68% 1.18%
Barley, Canadian Western No. 1 Spot 0.4 95.37 104.91 85.83 3.04 1.93 3.18% 1.84%
Beef, Australia/New Zealand frozen, U.S. import price 1.4 86.36 95.00 77.73 0.29 0.15 0.34% 0.16%
Coal thermal for export, Australia 2.7 30.66 33.73 27.60 0.74 0.54 2.42% 1.60%
Coal thermal for export, South Africa 0.7 29.31 32.24 26.38 0.52 0.35 1.76% 1.09%
Cocoa, ICO price, cif U.S. & European ports 0.7 1,391.62 1530.78 1252.45 70.90 39.03 5.09% 2.55%
Coffee, Other Milds, El Salvdor and Guatemala, ex-dock New York 1.4 106.64 117.31 95.98 13.49 6.98 12.65% 5.95%
Coffee, Robusta, Uganda and Cote dIvoire, ex-dock New York 0.6 49.91 54.90 44.92 12.86 4.68 25.77% 8.53%
Cocoanut Oil, Philippine/Indonesia, cif Rotterdam 0.2 558.32 614.15 502.48 46.78 24.30 8.38% 3.96%
Cooper 0.6 1,851.26 2036.38 1666.13 98.03 58.27 5.30% 2.86%
Cotton, Liverpool Index A, cif Liverpool 1.1 60.02 66.03 54.02 4.33 2.45 7.22% 3.71%
Fishmeal, 64/65 percent, any orig, cif Rotterdam 2.6 521.12 573.23 469.00 22.05 13.81 4.23% 2.41%
Groundnut, US runners, cif European 0 819.18 901.10 737.26 4.63 3.31 0.56% 0.37%
Hides;  US, Chicago, fob Shipping Point 3 82.89 91.18 74.61 0.15 0.08 0.18% 0.09%
Iron Ore Carajas 1.8 29.04 31.95 26.14 0.00 0.00 0.01% 0.00%
Lamb; New Zealand, PL frozen, London price 0.3 128.00 140.80 115.20 1.34 0.75 1.05% 0.53%
Lead; LME, 99.97 percent pure, cif European 0.3 553.02 608.32 497.72 15.56 10.25 2.81% 1.69%
Log; soft, export from U.S. Pacific coast 0.6 142.53 156.78 128.28 2.31 1.75 1.62% 1.11%
Log; hard, Sarawak, import price Japan 2 166.42 183.06 149.78 4.65 3.16 2.79% 1.72%
Maize; U.S. number 2 yellow, fob Gulf of Mexico 1.7 106.66 117.33 96.00 3.87 2.43 3.63% 2.07%
Russian Natural Gas, in Germany 2.1 95.73 105.30 86.16 4.50 3.20 4.70% 3.04%
Natural Gas, Indonesian LNG, CIF Japan 1.7 82.23 90.45 74.01 2.93 1.83 3.56% 2.02%
Natural Gas, US domestic; CIF Henry Hub, LA 0.7 100.79 110.87 90.71 8.54 4.79 8.48% 4.32%
Nickel; LME, melting grade, cif N Europe 1.2 6,672.93 7340.22 6005.64 217.58 129.21 3.26% 1.76%
Oil; Average of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate 39.9 20.32 22.35 18.28 1.00 0.61 4.92% 2.71%
Olive Oil, less that 1.5% FFA 0.2 3,613.95 3975.35 3252.56 223.04 127.39 6.17% 3.20%
Orange Brazilian, CIF France 0.5 475.03 522.54 427.53 13.58 8.78 2.86% 1.68%
Palm Oil; Malaysia and Indonesian, cif NW Europe 0.8 464.64 511.10 418.17 41.67 20.64 8.97% 4.04%
Hogs, 51-52% lean, 170-191 lbs; IL, IN, OH, MI, KY 1 57.76 63.53 51.98 2.96 1.89 5.12% 2.98%
Chicken, Ready-to-cook, whole, iced, FOB Georgia Docks 1 61.47 67.61 55.32 0.01 0.00 0.01% 0.00%
Rice; 5 percent broken, nominal price quote, fob Bangkok 1.1 215.00 236.50 193.50 13.59 7.48 6.32% 3.16%
Rubber; Malaysian, fob Malaysia and Singapore 1.1 39.69 43.66 35.72 3.80 2.10 9.57% 4.82%
Norwegian Fresh Salmon; farm bred; export price 2.6 2.07 2.28 1.87 0.05 0.03 2.27% 1.20%
Sawnwood; dark red meranti, select quality 1.4 568.44 625.29 511.60 18.75 12.75 3.30% 2.04%
Sawnwood; average of softwoods, U.S. West coast 2.4 289.74 318.72 260.77 0.03 0.01 0.01% 0.00%
Shrimp; U.S., frozen 26/30 count, wholesale NY 1.2 6.23 6.86 5.61 0.06 0.04 1.03% 0.65%
Soybean Meal; 44 percent, cif Rotterdam 1.1 194.31 213.74 174.88 7.16 4.88 3.68% 2.29%
Soybean Oil; Dutch, fob ex-mill 0.5 488.99 537.89 440.09 29.36 15.23 6.00% 2.83%
Soybean; U.S., cif Rotterdam 1.5 227.02 249.73 204.32 5.17 3.40 2.28% 1.36%
Sugar; EC import price, cif European 0.4 25.32 27.85 22.79 0.17 0.09 0.67% 0.34%
Sugar; International Sugar Agreement price 1.4 7.41 8.15 6.67 0.62 0.39 8.37% 4.84%
Sugar; US, import price contract number 14 cif 0.1 21.51 23.66 19.36 0.01 0.00 0.06% 0.01%
Sunflower Oil; any origin, ex-tank Rotterdam 0.3 571.37 628.51 514.23 23.21 12.85 4.06% 2.04%
Tea; From July 1998,Kenya auctions, Best Pekoe Fannings. Prior, London auctions, c.i.f. U.K. warehouses 0.4 203.01 223.31 182.71 4.98 3.58 2.45% 1.60%
Tin; LME, standard grade, cif European 0.3 7,746.65 8521.32 6971.99 365.49 233.17 4.72% 2.74%
Uranium, NUEXCO, Restricted Price, US$ per pound 0.7 10.44 11.48 9.39 0.40 0.23 3.85% 1.99%
Wheat; U.S. number 1 HRW, fob Gulf of Mexico 2.8 146.04 160.64 131.43 5.51 3.84 3.77% 2.39%
Wool Coarse; 23 micron, AWEX 0.4 408.00 448.80 367.20 25.52 13.58 6.26% 3.03%
Wool Fine; 19 micron, AWEX 0.6 670.15 737.16 603.13 7.62 4.50 1.14% 0.61%
Zinc; LME, high grade, cif UK 0.9 1,006.40 1107.04 905.76 21.58 16.17 2.14% 1.46%
CPI % of LR Price Index Wt 
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While alternative ‘jump diffusion’ time series models are available, and additional 
parameters could be added to the current model, this would simply change the nature of 
the estimation error. In any case, further parameter estimation is unnecessary because 
the simulation approach allows the residual empirical (unknown) distribution to be 
sampled directly. The empirical distribution was constructed from the 9 residual return 
values produced from each of the time series regressions and then duplicating them by 
multiplying by  –1 to produce a mirror image set of 9 returns of exactly equal and 
opposite magnitude. By combining the original and the mirror image set, this simple 
bootstrapping process not only doubles the size of the sample data set, but also 
automatically produces a symmetric distribution of returns with a zero mean. Sampling 
randomly from this distribution, with replacement, should therefore produce an 
unbiased set of random returns with no systematic trend component.  
 
The discounted payoff of a CPI contract of any time horizon (t) and assuming an 
annually compounded risk free discount rate (r
t) is: 
 












3.3. Portfolio Effects 
 
Inspection of the values in Table 4 reveals that the cost of a CPI on either the IMF 
Commodity Index or sub-indices is generally lower than the cost of CPI on an 
individual commodity. This is because of the well-known diversification effect of 
holding a basket of commodity price exposures that do not move up and down in lock 
step. For an industrialised country, without significant natural resources, and therefore 
essentially a primary commodity importer (e.g. Japan), the overall main IMF 
commodity index is likely to be a good proxy for the overall commodity price exposure 
which the economy faces, and the most effective method for offsetting the 
government’s exposure would be to purchase CPI-Max contracts on the main IMF 
commodity index. Using the data in Table 4, the cost of purchasing a trade weighted 
basket of CPI-Max contracts on all the individual commodities would therefore be 
1.76% of the underlying contract value versus 1.41% for a single CPI-Max contract of 
the same underlying contract value, but paying off against the main IMF Commodity 
Index.  
[ 6 ] 
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In contrast, most developing countries are both commodity producers and consumers 
and the significance of portfolio effects in reducing the costs of adopting a CPI scheme 
is much greater than for a developed country that is only a commodity importer. 
Pindyck & Rotemberg (1990) suggest that commodity prices tend to exhibit a 
surprising level of co-movement and that this is the “result of ‘herd’ behaviour” above 
and beyond what might be expected to arise from a “response to common 
macroeconomic shocks”. A possible explanation for the Pindyck & Rotemberg 
observation is that a single broadly based macroeconomic demand shock that causes a 
general increase (or decrease) in demand for all commodities would tend to drive prices 
up (or down) from their long-run equilibrium level which then revert over time without 
a further shock. In other words, there will appear to be a co-movement of prices both 
away from and towards the equilibrium level even though only one shock occurred. 
Once the mean reversion effect has been removed, many of the return series appear to 
be uncorrelated or even negatively correlated. 
 
This co-movement of prices and corresponding correlation in raw price returns 
therefore means that where a country is both an exporter and importer of commodities, 
the impact of a price rise (or fall) in exported commodity prices will tend to be more or 
less partly offset by a price rise (or fall) in imported commodity prices.  
 
In the special case of an economically diverse OECD economy (e.g. Japan) with 
significant sovereign debt, few commodity exports, and a wide range of commodity 
imports, it would be much less costly to buy CPI-Max contracts indexed and paying off 
against the entire IMF Commodity Index than to buy CPI contracts on individual 
commodities. Likewise, the government of a predominantly commodity-exporting 
country may find it more appropriate to buy CPI-Min contracts based on either the 
whole IMF Commodity Index or one or more of the 8 sub-indices. In both cases, the 
objective is to insure against a macroeconomic shock brought about by a general rise or 
fall in commodity prices, but take advantage of portfolio diversification effects to 
reduce the cost of purchasing the initial protection. In general, most economies are 
likely to be unaffected by a rise in one or a few commodity prices, unless they have a 
particularly heavy exposure to one, as this is likely to be offset by a fall in several 
others. However, as already discussed, a coordinated unidirectional shift in a wide 
range of commodity prices, as happened in the 1980s, can cause significant economic   41 
dislocation. It is this particular problem that CPI contracts indexed against a basket of 
commodities, rather than a single commodity, are well suited to manage at relatively 
low cost.  
 
3.4. Results Summary 
 
The analysis above shows that all the sub-index and individual spot commodity time 
series included in the IMF Commodity Index exhibited price mean reverting properties 
as evidenced by the b parameter from each regression being statistically significant at 
the 90% interval in each time series. Moreover, the speed of reversion in each case 
varied between 25 and 75% per annum, suggesting that shocks w ould not be so 
persistent as to threaten the viability of a CPI scheme from the outset. Though the mean 
reversion parameter estimation procedure will have accounted for much of the 
heteroscedacity (‘fat tails’) typically observed in commodity price returns, sampling 
directly from the empirical distribution of regression residuals means that there has 
been no need to estimate a volatility parameter based on the standard assumption that 
returns are normally distributed. As a result, the distribution of simulated five-year 
notional price paths that have been produced take into account the actual rather than 
approximated theoretical behaviour of commodity prices. The CPI values produced are 
not therefore subject to parameter estimation errors which are introduced when 
assumptions are made about the behaviour of commodity price returns (e.g. such as 
standard lognormal distribution of prices typically used in financial market models). 
 
The cost of a CPI contract based on the IMF Commodity Index is significantly lower 
than the mean cost of CPI contracts based on one of the sub-indices, or indeed 
individual commodities, because of the impact of portfolio effects. Since every country 
has a unique portfolio of exposures to both commodity imports and exports, the impact 
of portfolio effects would be an important factor in reducing the overall cost of CPI 
below the cost of maintaining an equivalent buffer stock scheme. The sampling method 
employed here maintained the temporal link between residual returns in each time 
period, across all the series. This has allowed a more precise estimate to be made of the 
true cost of a number of CPI contracts covering realistic commodity portfolio exposures 
than if a set of correlation coefficients had been calculated and applied to a covariance 
matrix.   42 
The only theoretical assumption that has been made about the behaviour of commodity 
prices is that they do not exhibit deterministic trends. This assumption is implicit in the 
decision to create symmetrical distributions from the original r aw residual returns 
output from the regression analysis. Although the previously cited literature is not 
definitive about the presence or absence of long-run trends in real or nominal 
commodity prices, over a five-year simulated price series, the impact is unlikely to be a 
significant source of error. In practice, if CPI contracts were being continuously bought 
and sold buyers and sellers would have the opportunity to incrementally adjust their 
expectations of long-run equilibrium price levels, reversion, v olatility, and correlation 
parameters. Prices of CPI contracts would thus evolve accordingly as forward and 
options prices currently do in existing commodity derivative markets – albeit at shorter 
maturities.    43 
4. IMPLICATIONS 
 
Despite the obvious commodity price risk exposure of governments and the risk it 
poses to the long-term economic development of national economies, few governments 
currently take any step to mitigate that risk by hedging their exposure. Likewise, 
despite the IMF objective of promoting global economic stability, recent discussion on 
the most appropriate mechanisms for restructuring sovereign debt when countries get 
into financial difficulty makes no reference to managing commodity price risk, but 
focuses only on economic reform. We believe this is a serious omission because the 
stability of the global economy cannot be effectively managed without addressing one 
of its main contributors, namely commodity price risk exposure of national 
governments. To this end, we believe that a CPI mechanism needs to be put in place, 
alongside IMF (and World Bank) sponsored economic reforms that will allow 
governments to manage their commodity price exposures. In the case of countries with 
heavy debt burdens, or those receiving IMF support, a commitment to use CPI contracts 
to mitigate the impact of commodity price volatility could become an integral part of 




The CPI mechanism discussed in this paper would avoid many of the weaknesses and 
criticisms of buffer stock schemes. Although long-run equilibrium prices and strike 
prices 10% above and below were identified for illustration purposes in the previous 
section, there would in practice be no need to establish any pre-determined intervention 
price level or intervention rules in a CPI scheme. Even if CPI contracts had an original 
ten-year maturity, rather than five as suggested here, the fact that they pay off against 
mean spot prices occurring over the final year before maturity would ensure that the 
impact of any unexpected shock that permanently changed the long-run equilibrium 
price level for a commodity would be rapidly subsumed into the portfolio of CPI 
contracts held by a government as long as new contracts were regularly signed each 
year to replace the ones that were about to come to maturity. Given the statistical 
properties of the commodity price series tested, and the inherent flexibility of a market-
based approach to the CPI contract, the probability of the CPI scheme being 
overwhelmed by stochastic and deterministic trends, or permanent price shocks, is   44 
significantly lower than a buffer stock scheme based on mechanistic intervention rules 
and government financing. 
 
4.2. Costs and Funding 
 
There are essentially three sources of costs to operating the GCI and the CPI contract 
portfolio that it manages. The first, and smallest, is the administrative cost of running 
the GCI. A reasonable cost estimate for operating a major commodity exchange comes 
from the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) which had operating costs of 
US$140 million for the year to December 2001. As well as direct operating costs, the 
GCI would also require some initial physical infrastructure cost expenditure plus 
working capital, which for NYMEX amounts to US$94 million of Net Assets. Added 
together, these figures suggest that GCI would require a single US$2 million up-front 
investment by each government that participated in the CPI scheme, plus a further 
US$1 million per year membership fee, to cover operating costs. In addition, a small 
commission or trading spread on each CPI contract could be applied to cover 
transaction processing costs, legal fees, and other direct costs such as costs of trading 
offsetting hedge contracts. Given the requirement for computer systems, people who 
are trained in commodity market transactions processing, as well as office space the 
cost of operating GCI as an insurer would not be significantly different. In total, if one 
hundred governments were to participate in the GCI, annual revenues would be of the 
order of US$250–500 million per annum. 
 
4.3. Capital Requirements 
 
If operated as a CPI exchange, the requirement for risk capital would be minimal 
providing that the counter-parties wishing to sell CPI hedging contracts paid the credit 
risk insurance cost. If the GCI agency operated as an insurer, or market maker for CPI 
contracts, the capital requirement would be significantly higher if it were taking market 
risk as principal that was not perfectly offsetting hedging  contracts purchased from 
third parties. The amount of risk capital required to support such an operation would 
depend on the amount of exposure that remained unhedged. Typically, banks and large 
commodity trading houses estimate the risk capital required to support a portfolio of 
derivative transactions by estimating the 95
th percentile (one-tailed 95% confidence   45 
interval) of the distribution of portfolio returns over the life of the outstanding 
derivative contracts – the Capital at Risk (CaR) value.  
 
Table 5 contains simulated values for the CaR at the 95%, 99% and 99.9% confidence 
interval assuming the GCI has sold an unhedged portfolio of one CPI-Max and one 
CPI-Min, both with a five-year maturity, covering the entire IMF Commodity Index. As 
previously, the initial underlying contract value of both CPI-Max and CPI-Min is 
assumed to be equal to the long-run equilibrium price of $99.36 and the respective 
strike prices of each is 10% respectively above and below that price. A sample of 1000 
five-year price paths was simulated with the discounted value of the CPI portfolio 
payoff calculated for each price path. The initial premium collected on both the CPI-
Max and CPI-Min sale was subtracted from the discounted payoff to estimate the total 
capital loss or gain on each price path. The payoffs were ranked with the largest 
positive payoff first and the largest negative payoff last. The 95% confidence interval is 
equal to the 950
th ranked value, the 99% confidence interval is equal to the 990
th 
highest ranked value, and the 99.9% confidence interval is the 999
th highest ranked 
value. The values in Table 5 show that to be confident of being able to meet 99% of the 
potential incidences of capital loss that might occur, the GCI would need to hold a 
capital reserve equal to 13.76% of the underlying exposure – that is US$100 in this 
case. It is not US$200 (i.e. the total underlying contract value) since only the CPI-Max 
or the CPI-Min can pay off at any one time. In practice, GCI would  need to hold a very 
small fraction of this amount of risk capital, of the order of 5–10%, if it were to follow 
a policy of purchasing nearly, or exactly, offsetting portfolios of hedge contracts from 
the capital market. Therefore if GCI sold and hedged US$20 billion of underlying 
contract value, split evenly between CPI-Max and CPI-min contracts, it would need the 
order of US$150 million of risk capital. 
Table 5: Global Commodity Insurer Capital at Risk 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
Confidence Interval 95.00% 99.00% 99.90%
Discounted Capital Loss 10.52 13.67 17.46
Equilibrium Contract Price 99.36 99.36 99.36
Capital at Risk 10.59% 13.76% 17.57%  46 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
Establishing a CPI scheme to insure fiscal revenues and government spending against 
commodity price shocks that create short-turn deviations from the sustainable long-run 
equilibrium level appears to be economically and technically feasible. By exploiting the 
option-like properties of an insurance contract, a CPI scheme would have a 
substantially lower cost than that of a comparable physical commodity buffer stock 
regime and amount to approximately 1 –2% of the total value of global primary 
commodity import-export trade per annum. In the specific case of oil, which would be 
the core commodity in the CPI scheme, the results suggest that the cost to a sovereign 
government of managing its exposure to oil price risk would be at most US$1.00 per 
barrel, which is one third of the cost of operating a physical buffer stock scheme such 
as the SPR of around US$3.50 per barrel over the same period and therefore a lesser 
burden to tax payers in the long run.  
 
In addition, the credit risk issues that typically exclude developing countries from 
participation in long-term financial market transactions could be entirely avoided. The 
capacity of the global financial system to manage the increased volume of trading in 
commodity derivatives that would be required to underpin the issuance of CPI 
contracts, also appears to be sufficient to cover the entire global primary commodity 
import-export trade. Politically, conditions appear to be more favourable than after the 
Second World War when Keynes proposed Commod Control. The developed world has 
become, and will continue to become, increasingly exposed to commodity price 
volatility, and particularly energy, as a result of the decline in their primary and 
secondary industrial base. This means that a CPI scheme would no longer be viewed as 
a mechanism for transferring f inancial assistance from the developed to developing 
world. Nor would it replace existing commodity stabilisation agreements such as those 
operated by OPEC and IEA in oil, or subsidy schemes such as CAP in agricultural 
commodities. Instead, the increasing  mutual interdependence of developed and 
developing nations in the global economy provides a backdrop of common economic 
interest that should increase the probability of a CPI scheme succeeding.  
 
Given the apparently favourable economic and political conditions, what is currently 
missing is a coordinating agency to focus liquidity in the trading of commodity 
derivative contracts at maturities beyond 12–24 months that are typically available in   47 
commodity derivative markets. The role of the GCI would be to complete the market 
for commodity derivatives by providing CPI contracts of an appropriate five- to ten-
year maturity, and indexed to mean annual commodity prices. This would more closely 
match the long-term nature of government investment programmes and the non-linear 
response of their fiscal revenues and public sector spending to changes in commodity 
prices. The open question that remains is to what extent a CPI scheme would impact the 
long-run equilibrium level and volatility of spot commodity prices, since it might create 
a large concentration of open interest in option contracts at specific strike prices as 
counter-parties attempted to hedge sales of CPI contracts to GCI.  
 
As for changes in the long-run equilibrium level of prices, it appears that the CPI is less 
likely to induce a change than a buffer stock scheme which has the overt objective of 
intervening to drive prices down to, or up from, their current level towards a pre-
determined upper or lower bound intervention level. Assuming sufficient capital is 
available to sustain a buffer stock scheme, then prices could be maintained at a level 
above or below the true long-run equilibrium price for a long period, creating a subsidy 
to either producers or consumers until the eventual collapse of the scheme. The 
operation of the CAP had precisely this effect before it was reformed in the 1990s, as 
US agricultural policy continues to do today, by creating large surplus stocks of 
agricultural commodities as a result of over-production stimulated by artificially high 
prices sustained by a lower intervention bound. These are eventually disposed of at, or 
below, world market prices. In Europe and the USA, this has benefited farmers but 
increased taxes and the cost of agricultural products for consumers. In the rest of the 
world, farmers would have been forced out of business, undercut by European and US 
agricultural products dumped on their markets, and consumers would have benefited, 
had it not been for the fact that their governments have often also increased taxes on 
consumers to keep their farmers in business through subsidies. A CPI scheme 
implemented without any other intervention in commodity markets would not have this 
effect.  
 
The effect of combining a CPI with an existing buffer stock scheme such as OPEC is 
more interesting to consider  – in particular the moral hazard problem that OPEC 
countries who had fully covered their production might no longer be interested in 
maintaining price discipline. Specifically, if one or a few OPEC countries managed to   48 
purchase CPI contracts to hedge their maximum possible current production volumes 
plus an incremental volume to cover future increases, the threat of retaliation by other 
OPEC members, which would result in a price crash, would not have any deterrent 
effect. Spot and forward prices would fall, but would not rise again until other 
unhedged OPEC members withdrew capacity to compensate for the increased 
production by those who had purchased CPI-in contracts. However, this kind of 
behaviour is very unlikely to occur since the moment it became public that even one 
OPEC member was attempting to force through a long-term increase in production via 
a CPI contract, all other OPEC members would immediately retaliate by attempting to 
contract CPI volumes sufficient to cover their maximum current and future potential 
output. Prices in the forward market would immediately collapse due to the increase in 
availability of long-term supply. This would immediately restore price discipline, 
unless OPEC members irrationally persisted in contracting at these lower price levels, 
at which point a new long-run equilibrium level would be established. Since OPEC has 
largely been successful in sustaining spot and short-term forward oil prices well above 
the competitive level for three decades there is no reason to believe that the 
introduction of a CPI scheme would cause this consensus to collapse in the long-term 
forward market.    49 
REFERENCES 
 
Aisenman, J. & Marion N. (1999), "Volatility and Investment: Interpreting Evidence from Developing Countries," 
Economica, Vol. 68, No 262, May, pp. 157–79.  
 
Bevan, D., Collier, P. & Gunning, J. W. (1993), “Trade Shocks in Developing Countries: Consequences and Policy”, 
European Economic Review, 37, 557–65. 
 
Bleaney, M. & Geenaway, D. (1993), “Long-run Trends in the Relative Price of Primary Commodities and in the 
Terms of Trade of Developing Countries”, Oxford Economic Papers, 45 (3), July, 349–63. 
 
Brealey, R. A. & Myers, S. (2002), Principles of Corporate Finance (7
th Edition), McGraw Hill. Inc. Singapore. 
 
Cashin, P., Liang, H. & McDermott, C.J. (2000), “How Persistent are hocks to World Commodity Prices”, IMF Staff 
Papers, 47 (2), 177–217. 
 
Cox, J. C. & Rubinstein, M. (1985), Option Markets, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 
 
Fossil Energy (2002), “Profile of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve”, Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 
http://www.fe.doe.gov/spr/ 
 
Gilbert, C. L. (1985), “Futures Trading and the Welfare Evaluation of Commodity Price Stabilisation”, Economic 
Journal, 95, September 637–61. 
 
Gilbert, C.L. (1996), “International Commodity Agreements: An Obituary Notice”, World Development, 24 (1), 1–
19. 
 
Graham, B. (1937), Storage and Stability: A Modern Ever-Normal Granary (Reprinted 1998 with foreword by I. 
Kahn), McGraw Hill, NY. 
 
Greenaway, D. & Morgan, C. W. (1999), “Introduction” The Economics of Commodity Markets, The International 
Library of Critical Writings in Economics, An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd. 
 
Guillaumont P. & Combes, J. L.  (1996), "The Effects of Producer Price Trends and Instability on the Growth of 
Agricultural Exports: A Cross-Section Analysis," in Economics of Agricultural Policies in Developing Countries, M. 
Benoit-Cattin, M. Griffon et P. Guillaumont (eds)  Revue Française d'Economie, 1996, 287–300. 
 
Hull, J. C., (1989), Options, Futures, and Other Derivative Securities, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 
 
IMF (2002), “Indices of Primary Commodity Prices, 1992  – current (in terms of US Dollars”,  IMF Primary 
Commodity Prices, http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp 
 
Kanbur, S. M. R. (1984), “How to Analyse Commodity Price Stabilisation? A Review Article”, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 36, 336–58. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1938), “The Policy of Government Storage of Food-Stuffs and Raw Materials”, Economic Journal, 
XLVIII, September, 449–60. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1942), "On Commod Control", in D. Moggridge, editor, 1980, Collected Writings of John Maynard 
Keynes, Vol. XXVII: Activities 1940–46 Shaping the Post-War World: Employment and Commodities, London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1943), "The Objective of Price Stability", Economic Journal, Vol. 53, No. 210, 185–7. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1944), "A Rejoinder to Professor Graham", Economic Journal, Vol. 54, December 429–30. 
 
Laughton, D.G. & Jacoby, H.D. (1995), “The Effects of Reversion on Commodity Projects of Different Length” in 
L. Trigeorgis (ed.), Real Options in Capital Investments: Models, Strategies, and Applications,  Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger Publisher,, pp.185–205. 
 
Maizels, A. (1992), “The Commodity Price Collapse of the 1980s” and “The Impact on the Developing Countries”, 
Commodities in Crisis: The Commodity Crisis of the 1980s and the Political Economy of International Commodity 
Policies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
   50 
Newbery, D. M. G. & Stiglitz, J. E. (1981),  The Economics of Commodity Price Stabilization: Study in the 
Economics of Risk, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
OECD (2002), Agricultural Policies IN OECD Countries Monitoring and Evaluation 2002: Highlights, Paris. 
 
OPEC (2000), OPEC Statute, Vienna: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, http://www.opec.org/ 
 
Pilipovic, D. (1998), Energy Risk – Valuing and Managing Energy Derivatives, McGraw-Hill, NY. 
 
Pindyck, R. S. & Rotemberg, J, J. (1990), “The Excess Co-movement of Commodity Prices”, Economic Journal, 
100, December, 1173–89. 
 
Prebisch, R., (1950),  The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, Economic 
Commission for Latin America, New York: United Nations: Department of Economic Affairs, 1–59. 
 
Schwartz, E. (1997), “The Stochastic Behavior of Commodity Prices: Implications for Valuation and Hedging", 
Journal of Finance, vol.52, no. 3:923–73 
 
Siegel, D. R. & Siegel, D. F. (1990), The Futures Markets, Maidenhead: McGraw Hill Book Company (UK) Ltd. 
 
Singer, H. W. (1950), “The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries”, American Economic 
Review, XL (2), May, 473–85. 
 
Spraos, J. (1980) “The Statistical Debate on the Net Barter Terms of Trade Between Primary Commodities and 
Manufacturers”, Economic Journal, 90, March, 107–28. 
 
UNCTAD (1969), Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, Geneva. 
 
UNCTAD (1991)  Africa’s Commodity Problems: Towards a Solution, A report by United Nations Secretary 
General’s Expert Group on Africa’s Commodity Problems, Geneva, UNCTAD Secretariat. 
 
UNCTAD (2001, 2002), Handbook of Statistics, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 
UNCTAD Secretariat. 
 
USDA (2002) Farm Bill, “Title I: Commodity Programs (A. Direct and Counter-Cyclical Programs” Washington 
DC, US Department of Agriculture http://www.usda.gov/farmbill/commodity_fb.html 
 
World Bank (1999) Dealing with Commodity Price Volatility in Developing Countries: A Proposal for a Market-
Based Approach, Discussion Paper for the Roundtable on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries 
(International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries), Washington D.C. 